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ABSTRACT
We use an extended version of the well-established Crepon, Duguet, and
Mairesse model [1998. “Research, Innovation and Productivity: An
Econometric Analysis at the Firm Level.” Economics of Innovation and
New Technology 7 (2): 115–158] to model the relationship between
appropriability mechanisms, innovation, and ﬁrm-level productivity. We
enrich this model in three ways: (1) We compare estimates obtained
using a broader deﬁnition of innovation spending to those that use R&D
spending. (2) We assume that a ﬁrm simultaneously innovates and
chooses among different appropriability methods to protect the
innovation. (3) We estimate the impact of innovation output on ﬁrm
productivity conditional on the choice of appropriability mechanism. We
ﬁnd that ﬁrms that innovate and rate formal methods for the protection
of intellectual property highly are more productive than other ﬁrms, but
that the same does not hold in the case of informal methods of
protection, except possibly for large ﬁrms as opposed to SMEs. We also
ﬁnd that this result is strongest for ﬁrms in the services, trade, and utility
sectors, and negative in the manufacturing sector.
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1. Introduction
Innovation is the engine of long-run growth. However, innovation does not ﬂourish in isolation, but it
is the result of the interactions among ﬁrms, policy-makers, and the institutions that shape the
environment where ﬁrms innovate. Among the institutions that matter for innovation, the legal
system for the protection of the intellectual property (IP) has a prominent role and unsurprisingly,
its design has been one of the main concerns of the innovation and technology policy across the
world. A welfare-enhancing legal system for the protection of the IP has to balance different require-
ments (Nordhaus 1969). On the one hand, it has to allow inventors to beneﬁt from their investment
by letting them appropriate some of the returns from their inventions. On the other hand, it has to do
so in such a way that the social costs associated with the creation of a (possibly short-term) legal mon-
opoly are minimised while not hindering the diffusion of the newly created knowledge across the
economic system (Levin et al. 1987; Gallini 2002; Kultti, Takalo, and Toikka 2007).
Most of the policy and academic debate around the beneﬁts and the social costs associated with
the existence of a legal system for the protection of a ﬁrm’s IP has revolved around patents (Boldrin
and Levine 2013; Moser 2013). In reality, patents are just one of the instruments that the legal system
offers to ﬁrms to protect their IP. Other mechanisms for appropriating the returns to knowledge
© 2016 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the
original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.
CONTACT Bronwyn H. Hall bhhall@berkeley.edu
Supplemental data for this article can be accessed at http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10438599.2016.1202513
ECONOMICS OF INNOVATION AND NEW TECHNOLOGY, 2017
VOL. 26, NOS. 1–2, 42–62
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10438599.2016.1202513
assets include formal methods (trademarks, copyrights, and design rights) and informal methods
(secrecy, lead time, conﬁdentiality agreements, and complexity). In fact, survey evidence ﬁnds that
ﬁrms do not consider patents the most effective appropriation mechanism. In two seminal papers
in this area, Levin et al. (1987) and Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh (2000) ﬁnd that informal methods
(lead time and secrecy) are considered by US manufacturing ﬁrms to be more effective than
patents for the protection of their IP. In addition, Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh (2000) ﬁnd that
patents are mostly used for strategic reasons. More recent data from the UK Community Innovation
Survey (CIS) show that the share of ﬁrms patenting among innovators is around 4% (Hall et al. 2013).
The implication is that any analysis on the relationship among appropriability mechanisms, inno-
vation, and ﬁrm-level performance needs to take into account two main issues: (a) formal and infor-
mal appropriability mechanisms are not mutually exclusive and ﬁrms can use both at the same time
and (b) the choice of the appropriability mechanisms (be it formal or informal) is correlated with the
type and quality of innovation. Thus, understanding how IP protection can foster innovation and
boost ﬁrm performance needs to control for the type of innovations (e.g. product versus process)
as well as their quality where possible.
This paper builds upon the existing literature on the choice of the appropriability mechanisms and
its impact on ﬁrm-level innovation and productivity. At the same time, it innovates in two ways: ﬁrst,
we explicitly model the emphasis ﬁrms place on formal and informal appropriability mechanisms and
we test the extent to which this emphasis is correlated with the type of innovation, conditional on
other ﬁrm characteristics. Second, we explore the relationship between ﬁrm performance and inno-
vation conditional on the ﬁrm’s preferred appropriability mechanisms.
Modelling the relationship between ﬁrm productivity, innovation, and appropriability mechanisms
presents a set of challenges, especially given the nature of the cross-sectional data available to us.
First, there is the issue of timing. We assume here that the ﬁrms that are in the process of developing
new products or new processes simultaneously decide whether to use formal or formal IP methods to
protect the intellectual capital attached to the associated inventions. Following the innovation and
choice of protection mechanism, we observe changes in ﬁrm performance due to the innovation
that are mediated by the chosen protection mechanism.
Second, there may be a reverse causality relationship between innovation output and pro-
ductivity; indeed it well may be that more productive ﬁrms may opt for formal IP methods (in par-
ticular, patents) as this may, for example, signal its proﬁtability and long-term viability to investors
(e.g. Hottenrott, Hall, and Czarnitzki 2016). We are able to address this issue by using data on inno-
vation and IP methods that are collected prior to the year in which performance (productivity) is
measured, under the assumption that the production of innovation and the choice of the IP
methods precede output temporally. This does not solve the problem of simultaneity induced by per-
manent unobservable differences in innovative capacity and output across ﬁrms, but it does mitigate
any bias arising from transitory effects. Given the fact that the panel structure of our data is very
sparse, we cannot do much better than this.
Our analysis is based on a new ﬁrm-level data set for the UK that combines information from a
range of different sources. We merge three waves of the UK Community Innovation survey (CIS 3,
4, and 5) to the Annual Respondents Database 2 (ARD2) and the Business Strategy Database
(BSD), which have information on ﬁrms’ inputs and outputs. To reduce endogeneity bias in the pro-
duction function, we use productivity data from the year after the innovation and R&D data. That is,
we merge each wave of the CIS with the subsequent period ARD information (i.e. data from CIS 4
pertaining to 2002–2004 are matched to the 2005 ARD, etc.). The resulting data set contains not
only detailed information on ﬁrms’ self-reported innovation activities from the UKCIS, but also
measures of ﬁrm inputs and outputs that allow estimation of the production function.
Only 40% of our sample of ﬁrms is in manufacturing, with the remainder in services, utilities, trade,
and construction. Innovation in these sectors may be quite different from innovation in manufactur-
ing, relying less on R&D and more on the introduction of new IT-based processes. Our data source
provides information on a broader deﬁnition of innovation spending of which only about 20% is
R&D spending and we also explore the use of this new variable in our model.
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Empirically, we use an extended version of the well-established Crepon, Duguet and Mairesse
model (1998) (CDM, henceforth) which relates R&D, innovation, and productivity. Our version of
the model is based on the model in Grifﬁth et al. (2006). We enrich this model in several ways. In
the CDM model, R&D is an input to the innovation production process and the knowledge produced
by innovation becomes an input to the production function. Our speciﬁcation differs from the usual
CDM model in several respects. First, we focus not only on R&D spending but also consider a broader
deﬁnition of innovation spending and compare those results to those using R&D only. Second, we
assume that a ﬁrm simultaneously innovates and chooses among the different appropriability
methods. Finally, we estimate the impact on ﬁrm performance of the innovation output conditional
on the choice of IP method(s).
Our key result is that ﬁrms who innovate and rate formal IP highly are more productive than other
ﬁrms, but that innovating ﬁrms which rate only informal IP highly do not see a productivity gain,
except possibly for larger ﬁrms. We also ﬁnd that this result is strongest for ﬁrms in the services,
trade, and utility sectors, and negative in the manufacturing sector, which is puzzling.
The paper is organised in the following way. Section 2 brieﬂy summarises the relevant empirical
literature. Section 3 illustrates the empirical framework we use for our analysis. The structure and the
content of the data sets are presented in Section 4 and in an appendix, while the results are shown in
Sections 5 and 6. Finally, some conclusions are presented in Section 7.
2. Appropriability mechanisms and ﬁrm-level performance: a brief survey
In other work, we have provided an extended survey of the economic literature on appropriability
(Hall et al. 2014) and we brieﬂy summarise what is known about appropriability and performance
here. The ﬁrst and most important fact to note is that in spite of the literature’s emphasis on
patents or more generally on formal mechanisms of IP protection, ﬁrms generally prefer informal
mechanisms, although they use both. Large-scale evidence for this point was ﬁrst reported in
Levin et al. (1987) and Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh (2000). Both papers report results of surveys of
the extent to which ﬁrms in different industries chose legal and non-legal methods to secure
returns from innovation and their ﬁndings were broadly consistent. In general, patents are not the
most important mechanism to protect a ﬁrm’s IP while secrecy and lead time are. However, there
are exceptions, especially for product innovations in some industries such as pharmaceuticals,
medical instruments, specialty chemicals, and machinery parts.
These two seminal papers have been followed by a raft of similar studies which have conﬁrmed
that the preference for informal appropriability mechanisms is not limited to US ﬁrms only. Arundel
(2001) focused on the relative effectiveness of patents and secrecy using the CIS I survey for six EU
countries and found that ﬁrms systematically regard lead-time and secrecy as more important ways
to protect their IP than patents.1 Laursen and Salter (2005) found that the ﬁrst mover advantage is the
preferred appropriability mechanism for UK ﬁrms, while Amara, Landry, and Traore (2008) conﬁrmed
these ﬁndings for Canadian ﬁrms from the knowledge intensive business sectors, but they also found
that patents and secrecy tend to be complementary, in line with what has been suggested by other
authors (see, for instance, Howells, James, and Malik 2003).
Why do ﬁrms use a variety of appropriability mechanisms? The strength of the legal mechanisms
for the protection of a ﬁrm’s IP, the nature of the technology, and the type of knowledge embodied in
the technology all inﬂuence the nature of the appropriability regime in an industry (Teece 1986; Hall
et al. 2013). So innovating ﬁrms may differ in their choice of the appropriability mechanisms and
these differences may be due to the characteristics of the knowledge embodied in the invention
(for instance, if some of the knowledge attached to an invention is tacit, secrecy may be sufﬁcient
to protect an invention), the type of innovation (process innovation can be protected by secrecy
more easily than product innovation), industry- and ﬁrm-level characteristics (size, innovation strat-
egies, etc.). Thanks to the volume of papers which have tried to understand why ﬁrms may ﬁnd
some appropriability mechanisms more effective than others, we now have a fairly good
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understanding of how each of the above factors inﬂuences the ﬁrms’ choice. For instance, we know
that the size of the ﬁrm matters. Arundel (2001) ﬁnds that large ﬁrms are more likely to patent than
small ﬁrms, likely because of the patent application costs some of which can be spread across many
patents.2 Hurmelinna-Laukkanen and Puumalainen (2007) ﬁnd that there exists a positive relationship
between pursuing short-term value and the use of lead time in a sample of 299 Finnish ﬁrms,
suggesting a relationship between business strategy and IP choice. Hanel (2005) also ﬁnds that Cana-
dian ﬁrms whose strategy focuses on the development of new markets are likely to use formal appro-
priability mechanisms like trademarks (but not patents), but that export strategies are not associated
with the use of intellectual property rights. Involvement in R&D cooperation has been found to
increase the value of patenting because patents help to deﬁne the property rights among the
members of the consortium (Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh 2000).3
We also know that the type of industry the ﬁrms operates in may inﬂuence the choice between
different appropriability mechanisms. Some studies have focused on services (rather than manufac-
turing) and they all suggest that most service ﬁrms do not use any IP at all and among those which
do, trademarks and copyrights (i.e. formal appropriability mechanisms) are the most used appropria-
bility mechanisms. Among the informal mechanisms, lock-in of customers, suppliers, and/or workers
is preferred to secrecy (Mairesse and Mohnen 2004; Hipp and Herstatt 2006).
Much empirical work conﬁrms that product innovations are more likely to be patented than
process innovations (e.g. Harabi 1995; Hanel 2005). The type of product (discrete or complex) also
matters. Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh (2000) divide manufacturing industries into industries where pro-
ducts are protected by one or a few patents held by a single ﬁrm (discrete) and industries where pro-
ducts involve technologies covered by a large number of patents held by more than one ﬁrm
(complex). They suggest that in discrete products industries patents are typically used more often
than secrecy. In contrast, in complex-products industries it is often much easier to invent around
technologies and this reduces the incentive to patent and may lead complex-product ﬁrms to rely
on alternative appropriability mechanisms (like lead time, for instance). The stage of development
of an innovation has a bearing on the choice between formal and informal mechanisms – ﬁrms
may use secrecy when developing a new technology but then apply for a patent when the new
product is about to be commercialised (Hussinger 2006).
Very little is known about the inﬂuence that the preference for secrecy (or informal appropriability
mechanisms, in general) may have on ﬁrm performance. A few studies have focused on ﬁnancial or
innovation performance and have tried to relate them to the ﬁrms’ preferences for the different
appropriability mechanisms. Using a data set of German manufacturing ﬁrms, Hussinger (2006)
ﬁnds a strong positive correlation between patents and sales of new products, whereas there is no
correlation for secrecy. Hanel (2008) focused on proﬁts among Canadian manufacturing ﬁrms, mod-
elling the relationship between proﬁts and the choice of the preferred IP mechanism(s) in a two-stage
model where the ﬁrst stage estimates the propensity of innovative ﬁrms to use IP mechanisms and
the second stage estimates the impact of this choice on the proﬁts. The main conclusion is that ﬁrms
that use formal appropriability mechanisms increase or maintain their proﬁt. Similarly, Hall et al.
(2013) ﬁnd that ﬁrms’ preference for patents is positively associated with innovative performance
measured as turnover due to innovation although there is little relationship between patenting
and other measures of performance such as employment growth. These ﬁndings seem to suggest
that patents are used to protect product innovations which have a direct bearing on proﬁts and
sales while secrecy may be rather used either for process innovation or for early-stage inventions
that will be commercialised later on.
The studies reviewed here focus mainly on manufacturing where formal IP in the form of patents is
traditionally associated with innovation. Services can be different: innovation among service ﬁrms
may not be technology-related and there might be no beneﬁt from using formal IP protection.4
So we could potentially observe innovative service ﬁrms which are more productive than their
non-innovative counterparts but, at the same time, showing a preference for secrecy. A recent
study by Morikawa (2014) presents some circumstantial evidence suggesting that higher productivity
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among services may be correlated with the preference for informal appropriability mechanisms
(proxied by their trade secret holdings) among innovative Japanese service ﬁrms.
In summary, this short survey conﬁrms the importance of the informal as well as formal appropria-
bility mechanisms and their bearing on ﬁrm-level productivity and proﬁts. It also identiﬁes some
characteristics of the ﬁrms, of the technology and of the industries which are associated with the
choice of the appropriability regime and which we will employ for our empirical analysis.
3. Empirical framework
The empirical framework we employ here is based on the CDMmodel (Crepon, Duguet, and Mairesse
1998). Our model captures the original ﬂavour of the CDM model in that it models the relationship
between R&D, innovation and productivity in a sequential manner. Our innovations to this model are
to include the choice of formal and informal appropriability mechanisms along with innovation
success and to ask how these inﬂuence the resulting productivity from innovations. We also exper-
iment with the use of innovation spending rather than R&D spending as an input to innovation, in line
with our use of service sector data as well as manufacturing sector data.
One of the well-established limitations of the CDM model is that it does not identify causal
relationships among the variables but instead describes their correlation, due to the cross-sectional
nature of the data to which it is applied. We have tried to mitigate this in two ways. First, our empirical
model is based on a set of exclusion restrictions which are grounded in economic theory. For
instance, we have assumed that the decision to invest in innovation and the amount invested
depend on the general IP environment in the sector, but that the ﬁrm’s own rating of IP is jointly
determined with its innovation success or failure. Second, we have used productivity data in the
year following the last year in each innovation survey, so that the R&D or innovation expenditure
and innovation performance precedes the performance measure, although we are aware that this
is a weak identiﬁcation strategy and does not fully solve the endogeneity problem.
Our empirical model is formalised in three stages. In Stage 1, we model the ﬁrm’s decision to invest
in innovation as well as the intensity of the innovation expenditure. In Stage 2, we model in a sim-
ultaneous fashion the production of innovation and the choice of the appropriability mechanism.
In the third stage, we model the process of exploitation of innovation by estimating an augmented
production function that includes the predicted innovation output, with its impact allowed to vary
with the choices of appropriability mechanisms. We describe each stage in more detail below.
Stage 1: the ﬁrst two equations model the ﬁrm’s decision to invest in innovation and the intensity
of its innovation expenditure using a sample selection model. In the empirical work, we will measure
innovation expenditure either by R&D or total innovation spending.
isi = 10
( )
if is∗i = wia+ 1i
. 0
≤ 0
( )
i = 1, . . . ., N, (1)
where is∗ is an unobservable latent variable whose value determines whether the ﬁrm invests in inno-
vation, is is an observed indicator which equals zero for ﬁrms that do not invest in innovation and one
for innovation-investing ﬁrms. w is a vector of variables explaining the investment decision, α is a
vector of parameters to be estimated, and εi is an error term, assumed to be normally distributed.
Conditional on ﬁrms investing in innovation, we observe the amount of resources invested in
innovation (isi, measured here as innovation expenditure intensity, the logarithm of the innovation
expenditure per employee):
isii = zib+ ei if isi = 00 if isi = 0
( )
, (2)
where zi is a vector of variables affecting the innovation expenditure intensity, β is the vector of coef-
ﬁcients, and ei is an error term. Assuming that the two error terms are distributed as a bivariate normal
46 B. H. HALL AND V. SENA
with zero mean, variances s21 = 1 and s2e , and a correlation coefﬁcient ρ, the system of Equations (1)
and (2) can be estimated as a generalised Tobit model by maximum likelihood estimation.
Stage 2. The second block consists of a set of innovation production functions and the equations
which describe the choices among appropriability mechanisms. We distinguish between two types of
innovation outcomes (product and process innovations) and between formal (patents, design, and
copyrights) and informal (secrecy, conﬁdentiality agreements, complexity, and lead time) appropria-
bility mechanisms. Although ideally we would like to include product and process innovations in the
same model, we found that their ﬁtted values after instrumenting were so highly correlated that it
was difﬁcult to obtain sensible results when both variables were included in an equation.5 Therefore,
we chose to analyse one type of innovation at a time (product or process) due to lack of identifying
power.
We assume that the choice of the appropriability mechanism and the innovation production func-
tions are correlated conditional on their predictor variables and therefore we estimate using a multi-
variate probit model. Formally, the model is speciﬁed as a system of three equations:
INNi
IIPi
FIPi
⎛
⎝
⎞
⎠ = F g1isi∗ + X1i d1 + d1s + d1tg2isi∗ + X2i d1 + d2s + d2t , S
g3isi∗ + X3i d1 + d3s + d3t
⎛
⎝
⎞
⎠, (3)
where Φ (., Σ) is the multivariate normal distribution, isi* is the predicted value of the innovation
expenditure intensity (controlling to some extent for the fact that the investment in innovation is
endogenous to the production of innovation), the Xs are vectors of variables that affect ﬁrms’ propen-
sity to innovate and their choice between formal and informal appropriability mechanisms, and ds
and dt are industry and wave dummies. Each type of innovation output (either new to the ﬁrm or
to the market) is proxied by a dummy variable (INN) indicating whether the ﬁrm has introduced at
least one product/process innovation in the last three years. The dependent variables of the two
IP equations are also proxied by dummy variables (FIP for the formal IP methods and IIP for the infor-
mal ones): each takes the value of one if the ﬁrm rated at least one of the relevant methods as of
medium or high importance to the enterprise.
We estimate (3) simultaneously as a trivariate probit system using the GHK algorithm (Cappellari
and Jenkins 2003), assuming that the three disturbances are correlated. As in Grifﬁth et al. (2006), the
predicted values from the ﬁrst-stage estimation computed for all ﬁrms taking into account the prob-
ability that their innovation expenditure is observed are used to proxy innovation effort in the inno-
vation production function. This approach assumes that a ﬁrm that reports no innovation
expenditure may still have some informal expenditure related to innovation that is not reported.
Stage 3. The augmented production function is a standard Cobb–Douglas model where the log-
arithms of labour (l ), capital (k), and purchased goods and services (m) are inputs along with the inno-
vation outputs. We interact the innovation variables with the two dummy variables for formal and
informal IP in order to assess the contribution of IP to the exploitation of innovation. To control
for the potential endogeneity of the innovation output, we use the predicted values from the inno-
vation production functions (INN*) rather than the actual values.6 We also include the usual set of
industry and survey dummies to control for unobserved characteristics that affect the output level.
Formally, the augmented production function is as follows:
yi = a+ bkki + blli + bmmi
+ p1 ̂INN∗i + p2IIPi + p3FIPi + p4IIPi · ̂INN∗i
+ p5FIPi · ̂INN∗i + ds + dr + vi.
(4)
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4. Data and variables
4.1. Data
The data set we have used for our analysis has been constructed by merging several databases com-
piled by the UK Ofﬁce for National Statistics (ONS) and made available through the SecureLab at the
UK Data Service. The databases are the following: the Business Structure Database, containing basic
information about the ﬁrm demographics, the ARD, containing information about ﬁrm inputs and
outputs, and the UK CIS (waves 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7) which has information about innovation, R&D,
and the preferred appropriability mechanisms. Appendix A has more details about the data sets
and the merging procedure.
Our resulting data set is an unbalanced panel containing detailed information on ﬁrm character-
istics and innovative activities over the 1998–2010 period. However, the main results of the paper
refer to the period 1998–2006, because the IP questions in CIS 6 and 7 were not comparable. In
the later period, ﬁrms were asked only about their use of formal IP methods (rather than their impor-
tance), and no questions on informal methods were included.
As this paper is concerned with innovation and IP behaviour, it uses only the sample of ﬁrms
surveyed by the CIS; we drop all ﬁrms from the integrated data set that have not been sampled in
at least one of the CIS waves. Thus, the BSD and ARD2 are used only to enrich the data set avail-
able from the CIS. Each CIS refers to several years (CIS 3 to 1998–2000, CIS 4 to 2002–2004, CIS 5 to
2004–2006, CIS 6 to 2006–2008, and CIS 7 to 2008–2010) with 2001 being a missing year. We
linked each wave of the CIS with the next period ARD2 (i.e. CIS 4 (2002–2004) ﬁrms are
matched to the 2005 ARD2 and so on) in order to reduce simultaneity problems between our inno-
vation, appropriability, and productivity measures. Note that because a new sample of ﬁrms is
drawn for each CIS (in principle), there is relatively little overlap among the surveys and the
average number of observations per ﬁrm is about 1.3.7 This fact means that panel data estimation
controlling for ﬁxed ﬁrm effects is infeasible.
Tables A1 and A2 in the online appendix A (http://eml.berkeley.edu//~bhhall/papers/HallSena_
appendix_Mar15.pdf) give a quick overview of the main characteristics of the basic data set. The inter-
esting feature of these data is that there is not too much variation across the different CIS waves and
this suggests that most of the variation is cross-sectional. There are a total of 68,112 observations in
the combined CIS 3–7 surveys, of which 48,107 match with the ARD. About half of these either were
missing industry, were in the primary industries or in service sectors that were not covered by all the
CIS, or were non-proﬁts or government ﬁrms.8 We also lose an additional ∼10,000 observations due
to missing values in some of the key variables, or due to sparse coverage in certain 3-digit industries.
The resulting sample contains 10,850 observations on 7255 ﬁrms and the sample for CIS3,4,5 contains
7144 observations on 5,684 ﬁrms (or enterprises).
4.2. Variables
In the empirical implementation of the model outlined in Section 2, we have followed the existing
empirical literature on the determinants of the investment in R&D (and in other types of innovation
expenditure) and of the production of innovation in the CDM model.
Stage 1.We assume that the industry-level appropriability environment can inﬂuence the amount
of innovation expenditure undertaken by ﬁrms (although the ﬁrm’s own innovation success affects its
choice of IP directly). This assumption is reasonable as we would expect ﬁrms to invest more in R&D
(or any other type of innovation expenditure) if the industry environment is such that they can appro-
priate most of the returns from their investment (Arrow 1962). As in Grifﬁth et al. (2006), the variables
that capture the industry environment with respect to appropriability are deﬁned as binary variables
equal to one if the ﬁrm rates any one of the formal (informal) IP methods as of high or medium impor-
tance. They are then averaged over 3-digit industry.
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Additional controls include theﬁrm’s propensity to export (here proxiedby adummyvariable taking
the value of one if the ﬁrms has exports) and whether the ﬁrm is foreign-owned. The ﬁrst variable cap-
tures the notion that exporting ﬁrms may be more willing to invest in R&D (or any other innovation
spending) as the competition and the learning effect of exporting should enhance its innovative
effort (Crespi and Zuniga 2012). The second variable controls for the possibility that foreign ﬁrms
may bemore innovative (and therefore more willing to spendmore in R&D) than national ﬁrms poten-
tially because of their superior management practices and human capital (Grifﬁth 1999; Kumar and
Aggarwal 2005; Girma and Gorg 2007). Additional controls include size (measured by the log of the
number of employees) and age (measured by the log of the age). The expectation is that larger
ﬁrms may be more inclined to invest in innovation as it is easier for them to spread the ﬁxed costs
of the investment in innovation than for smaller ﬁrms (Cohen and Levin 1989; Cohen and Klepper
1996). Equally, the empirical literature suggests that older ﬁrms tend to invest more in R&D than
younger ones because of the need for specialist skills that younger ﬁrms may lack (see, for instance,
Zahra, Keil, and Maula 2005), although it is possible that new entrants in technology sectors actually
invest at a higher rate in the hope of future sales. Thus, the age effect can go either way.
We also control whether the ﬁrmhas a cooperative arrangementwith another organisation for inno-
vation by introducing a dummy variable taking the value of one for those ﬁrms which have a coopera-
tive arrangement. Several authors suggest that collaboration stimulates further innovation investment
by allowing ﬁrms to share costs and internalising knowledge spillovers (see Kamien, Oren, and Tauman
1992). We include a set of categorical variables indicating the intensity of use of different information
sources in innovation-related activities (Grifﬁth et al. 2006; Crespi and Zuniga 2012); these take the
value one if information from internal sources/customers/suppliers/competitors/universities was of
high or medium importance. As in Grifﬁth et al. (2006), we introduce demand-pull factors (namely
related to the need to meet regulations and industry standards) in our equations which are proxied
by the share of ﬁrms in the 3-digit industry for which meeting regulations or standards were of
high, medium, or low importance for innovation (as opposed to no importance).9
We control for the industry-level perception of barriers to innovation due to either ﬁnancial con-
straints or uncertain demand for new products. Several papers suggest that ﬁnancial factors are an
important impediment to R&D spending (Hall 2002; Hall and Lerner 2010).10 Equally, industries
characterised by uncertainty in the new products’ markets are characterised by low levels of R&D
spending.11 The average perception of ﬁnancial constraints for innovation and constraints due to
market risk (uncertain demand) in the 3-digit industry are each measured as the average of the quali-
tative indicator 0,1,2,3. Finally, we have included 25 dummy variables for the 2-digit industry to which
the ﬁrm belongs, and 2 dummy variables for the CIS waves. The excluded industry is automobile man-
ufacturing and the excluded wave is CIS3.
Stage 2. The key independent variable in Stage 2 (and appearing in all the equations of Stage 2) is
the predicted value of the log of the innovation expenditure intensity (derived from the ﬁrst-stage
estimates). As mentioned in Section 2, this way the model takes into account the fact that the inno-
vation expenditure is endogenous to the production of innovation and ﬁrm preferences over appro-
priability mechanisms.
The innovation and appropriability equations share some independent variables with the
equations from Stage 1: size, age, the dummy for cooperation and the dummies for the sources of
information, the survey year, and the two-digit industry. The rationale for including them among
the regressors in the innovation equations is that they may inﬂuence innovation success given inno-
vation input. As for the appropriability equations, Arundel (2001) ﬁnds that large ﬁrms are more likely
to patent than small ﬁrms because of the costs associated with the enforcement of patents. Involve-
ment in inter-ﬁrm cooperation has also been found to inﬂuence the choice of the IP method. Firms
that engage in cooperative arrangements may be interested in using formal IP methods as patents
would help them when bargaining with the other partners of the research consortium (Cohen,
Nelson, and Walsh 2000). Finally, the use of different types of information sources can be associated
with the preference for speciﬁc IP methods. For instance, ﬁrms which source information from
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universities may be more likely to patent while those which source information from competitors or
suppliers may prefer to use secrecy or lead time to protect their IP.
Consistently with the empirical literature in this area, we also control for the perceived ﬁnancial
constraints at the ﬁrm level (a dummy variable equal to one if the ﬁrm reports constraints) and
the perceived demand for innovation (a dummy variable equal to one if the ﬁrm considers the
demand for innovation too uncertain) in both the innovation and the appropriability equations.
Financially constrained ﬁrms are less likely to produce innovation while at the same time they
may prefer informal IP methods (see Scellato 2007; Hall et al. 2013). Also, ﬁrms facing uncertain
demand for innovation may decide to patent because of the real option that patents generate
(Bloom and Van Reenen 2002). We also include two indicators of demand-pull factors for innovation:
whether the ﬁrm rated meeting regulations or standards of medium or high importance for inno-
vation (as opposed to no or low importance) and whether environmental concerns were of
medium or high importance for innovation (as opposed to no or low importance).
To help identify the separate equations, we assume that the direction of innovation (i.e. the
reasons for innovating) is related to the type of innovation but not to the preference for formal
and/or informal appropriability methods. Therefore, in the product innovation equation, we
include dummy variables indicating whether innovation was directed towards increasing the
range of products, expanding to new markets or increasing market share, or improving the quality
of products. In the process innovation equation, we include dummy variables indicating whether
innovation was directed towards improving the ﬂexibility of production, increasing capacity, or low-
ering unit costs. We assume also that whether a ﬁrm prefers either of the IP methods is related to
whether the innovation is new to the market. Therefore, in the appropriability equations only, we
introduce a dummy variable if the ﬁrm’s innovation is new to the ﬁrm but not the market. We
exclude the foreign ownership, exports, and the 3-digit industry-level variables from the equations
in Stage 2. Our assumption is that these drive the innovation or R&D decision but do not predict inno-
vation output once we control for the level of spending.
Stage 3. In the production function, output is measured as sales while labour is measured by the
number of employees, capital by the total stock of physical capital, constructed from the investment
series using a 10% depreciation rate, and materials by purchased goods and services. We also include
the predicted value of innovation output from the second stage, the formal and informal IP dummies,
and their interactions with innovation outputs.
Tables A3 and A4 in the appendix give descriptive statistics for all ﬁrms in the estimation sample as
well as for the ﬁrms with positive R&D spending and the larger set of ﬁrms with positive innovation
spending. Table A3 shows the medians and interquartile ranges for the continuous variables and A4
the means for all the dummy variables. The median ﬁrm has 305 employees, value added of 9 million
pounds sterling, and a capital stock of 5 million pounds sterling. On average, the ﬁrms are 28 years old
and 25% are foreign-owned, but 48% export. Thirty-three per cent of the ﬁrms have introduced pro-
ducts new to the ﬁrm or market in the past three years (22% new to the market), and 26% have intro-
duced a process innovation during the same period (7% new to the market). Thirty-ﬁve per cent rate
some form of formal IP of medium to high importance, whereas 45% rate informal IP of medium to
high importance.
In addition to R&D spending, which has been well studied in the past, this paper also looks at the
broader deﬁnition of innovation spending, which includes internal and external R&D, purchase of
new capital equipment for innovation, purchase of external knowledge, and marketing and training
expense associated with the introduction of new products and processes. The total of this spending is
substantially larger than R&D alone, and many more ﬁrms have non-zero expenditures. The median
innovation expenditure per employee is 158,000 pounds sterling. The R&D-doing ﬁrms are higher on
all the IP and innovation dimensions. They are also large, and have higher non-R&D innovation
expenditure, with a median that is ﬁve times the R&D median. When we add the ﬁrms that have
other types of innovation expenditure to the R&D-doing ﬁrms, the IP and innovation indicators gen-
erally fall, but are still higher than those for ﬁrms with no innovation expenditure at all.
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Table A5 gives some information about the composition of innovation spending. By far the largest
share of such spending is for the acquisition of machinery and computer hardware and software,
especially in SMEs and service ﬁrms. Internal R&D spending is a relatively small share (less than
20%) of innovation spending, although it is somewhat more important for manufacturing ﬁrms.
This conﬁrms the fact that innovation in ﬁrms is a much broader concept than innovation associated
with R&D. We expect that process innovation and innovation in services in particular to be associated
with the acquisition of new equipment and software, rather than with R&D per se.
5. Results
We present two versions of our estimates of the CDMmodel, one that uses R&D spending as the inno-
vation input and one using the broader deﬁnition of innovation spending that includes R&D, new
capital equipment, and training and marketing associated with innovation. Table 1 shows stage 1
estimates for both the R&D and the innovation models. Tables 2 and 3 show the innovation-IP
equation estimates using R&D as an input; the analogous tables using innovation spending are in
Appendix B. Finally, Tables 4 and 5 show the production function estimates for the two models. In
the next two subsections of the paper, we discuss the results that use R&D as an input ﬁrst, followed
by those using innovation spending.
5.1. R&D spending
The results from Table 1 show that the choice of a sample selectionmodel with correlated disturbances
is supported by the data. The estimates show that ﬁrms which invest in R&D (even though they are not
predicted to) also have higher R&D than predicted. Firms in industries that rate formal appropriability
mechanisms as ofmediumorhigh importance investmore in R&D,with a coefﬁcient that implies adou-
bling of R&Dper employee, even in the presence of two-digit sector dummies. For informal IPmethods,
the coefﬁcient is somewhat lower, but the conﬁdence interval overlapswith that for formal IPmethods.
Looking at the predictor variables, ﬁrms that invest in R&D are exporters, and if they export, their
R&D investment rate is about 65% higher. Foreign-owned ﬁrms are slightly less likely to invest in R&D,
but when they do, they have a higher R&D investment rate, other things equal. The uses of different
sources of information for innovation are generally positive for investing R&D and R&D intensity, as is
collaboration with other organisations and ﬁrms. As we control for two-digit industry, the sector-
speciﬁc characteristics generally do not enter, with the exception of the attitudes towards IP protec-
tion, which has a positive impact on R&D intensity.
Table 2 (product) and Table 3 (process) focus on the choice of the IP methods and on the inno-
vation production function. The hypothesis that the type of innovation and the choice of IP
methods are positively correlated conditional on the observables is conﬁrmed by the data, with all
correlations signiﬁcantly positive, and ranging from 0.04 to 0.55; most are above 0.1.
In general, the results for product and process innovators are quite similar but there are some
important differences. Firms rating some form of IP highly are larger ﬁrms with high R&D intensity
and are likely both to rate demand uncertainty large and to consider themselves ﬁnancially con-
strained. Firms that are imitators (that is, they produce innovations that are new to the ﬁrm but
not to the market) rate formal IP of less importance. Where the source of information for innovation
is suppliers or competitors, ﬁrms tend to rate the use of formal and informal IP highly. However, when
customers are the main source of information or the source is within group, they are less likely to
consider formal IP mechanisms as important, which is perhaps not surprising, as these entities are
less capable of imitation. More surprising is the fact that ﬁrms collaborating for innovation are less
likely to rate formal IP highly.
Turning to the innovation equations (third columns of Tables 2 and 3), we observe that product
innovators have a high predicted R&D intensity from the previous stage of estimation but that
process innovation appears to be less driven by R&D. Larger ﬁrms are more likely to innovate, but
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Table 1. Sample selection estimates – investment in R&D or innovation and its intensity.
Dependent variable
Invests in R&D (1/0) Log (R&D/employee) Invests in innovation (1/0) Log (IS/employee) Invests in HW/SW (1/0) Log (HW&SW/employee)
Coefﬁcient
Standard
errors
Marginal
effects
Standard
errors Coefﬁcient
Standard
errors
Marginal
effects
Standard
errors Coefﬁcient
Standard
errors
Marginal
effects
Standard
errors
Log (number of
employees)
0.073 0.013 *** −0.230 0.033 *** 0.024 0.011 * −0.263 0.021 *** 0.003 0.010 −0.266 0.025 ***
Log (ﬁrm age in 2011) 0.011 0.056 −0.202 0.108 −0.077 0.051 −0.052 0.072 −0.083 0.047 −0.052 0.087
D (foreign ownership) −0.097 0.046 * 0.320 0.087 *** −0.071 0.043 0.291 0.061 *** −0.126 0.040 ** 0.280 0.077 ***
D (export status) 0.314 0.045 *** 0.651 0.096 *** 0.163 0.042 *** 0.418 0.060 *** 0.104 0.039 ** 0.263 0.073 ***
D (collaborates) 0.415 0.047 *** 0.475 0.091 *** 0.272 0.055 *** 0.393 0.057 *** 0.157 0.046 *** 0.016 0.072
Importance of formal IP in
the 3-digit sector
0.256 0.170 1.050 0.299 *** −0.284 0.165 0.351 0.212 −0.396 0.156 −0.335 0.270
Importance of informal IP
in the 3-digit sector
0.242 0.188 0.637 0.315 * 0.378 0.183 * 0.710 0.231 *** 0.180 0.171 0.978 0.304 **
Perception of market risk
in the 3-digit sector
0.348 0.182 0.017 0.292 0.156 0.175 −0.017 0.212 0.016 0.160 0.011 0.276
Perception of ﬁnancial
constraints in the 3-digit
sector
−0.290 0.171 −0.256 0.284 −0.218 0.166 0.224 0.198 −0.113 0.154 0.282 0.262
Importance of regulation
& standards in the 3-
digit sector
0.016 0.198 0.427 0.354 0.127 0.197 0.150 0.250 −0.136 0.178 −0.198 0.309
Importance of
environmental, health &
safety regs. in the 3-
digit sector
−0.037 0.186 −0.296 0.347 0.059 0.185 −0.002 0.243 0.412 0.166 * 0.613 0.292
D (within-group
important info source)
1.026 0.059 *** 0.859 0.195 *** 0.790 0.045 *** 0.292 0.077 *** 0.473 0.046 *** −0.009 0.094
D (suppliers’ important
info source)
0.044 0.048 −0.279 0.086 ** 0.493 0.042 *** 0.326 0.060 *** 0.734 0.041 *** 0.560 0.106 ***
D (customers’ important
info source)
0.305 0.056 *** 0.392 0.112 *** 0.401 0.049 *** 0.145 0.068 * 0.180 0.049 *** 0.039 0.080
D (competitors’ important
info source)
−0.072 0.046 0.055 0.081 −0.026 0.048 0.169 0.055 ** −0.023 0.043 0.016 0.066
D (universities’ important
info source)
0.307 0.061 *** 0.410 0.097 *** 0.050 0.074 0.238 0.071 *** 0.080 0.059 −0.063 0.089
Year Dummies 51.8 (0.000)*** 3.2 (0.206) 39.5 (0.000)*** 2.4 (0.295) 49.8 (0.000)*** 0.9 (0.649)
Two-digit sector dummies 101.6 (0.000)*** 181.8 (0.000)*** 34.7 (0.093)* 163.2 (0.000)*** 56.5 (0.000)*** 191.4 (0.000)***
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Correlation of the disturbances in the
two equations
0.349 0.101 ** 0.064 0.043 0.256 0.095 **
Standard error of log R&D per employee
residual
1.637 0.046 *** 1.576 0.019 *** 1.686 0.033 ***
Log likelihood −7097.7 −11696.9 −10479.1
Wald test for model (d.f.) 914.7 (43)*** 1082.7 (43)*** 585.6 (43)***
Observations (non-zero
share)
7144 (30%) 7144 (62%) 7144 (47%)
Notes: Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity, clustered by enterprise. The method of estimation is maximum likelihood on a generalised Tobit model. *, **, and *** denote signiﬁcance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% level respectively.
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Table 2. Multivariate Probit estimates of IP choice and product innovation.
Formal IP methods Informal IP methods
Product innovator or
imitator
Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE
Log (predicted R&D per employee) 0.843 0.045 *** 0.638 0.044 *** 0.304 0.046 ***
Log (number of employees) 0.321 0.016 *** 0.229 0.015 *** 0.116 0.015 ***
Log (ﬁrm age in 2011) 0.132 0.054 * 0.114 0.053 * −0.057 0.057
D (collaborates) −0.191 0.052 *** −0.026 0.054 0.428 0.053 ***
Firm perception of market risk 0.324 0.043 *** 0.366 0.044 *** 0.172 0.044 ***
Firm perception of ﬁn. Constraints 0.123 0.043 ** 0.293 0.044 *** 0.018 0.044
Firm – impt. of reg. & standards 0.140 0.050 ** 0.121 0.052 * −0.118 0.053 *
Firm – impt. of env., H&S regs. 0.052 0.051 0.160 0.054 ** −0.023 0.054
D (innov. to improve range) 0.704 0.051 ***
D (innov. for new markets) 0.234 0.054 ***
D (innov. for quality improvement) 0.266 0.058 ***
D (within-group impt. info source) −0.234 0.066 *** 0.096 0.064 0.311 0.068 ***
D (suppliers important info source) 0.289 0.047 *** 0.415 0.047 *** 0.123 0.051 *
D (customers impt. info source) −0.127 0.054 * 0.140 0.053 ** 0.139 0.058 *
D (competitors impt. info source) 0.173 0.045 *** 0.130 0.045 ** −0.113 0.047 *
D (universities impt. info source) 0.058 0.064 0.049 0.071 −0.080 0.066
D (imitator) −0.270 0.060 *** −0.266 0.064 ***
Year dummies (2) 65.4 (0.000)*** 80.1 (0.000)*** 1.5 (0.464)
Two-digit sector dummies (25) 298.2 (0.000)*** 105.4 (0.000)*** 52.9 (0.000)***
Wald test for model (d.f.) 5322.1 (125)***
Corr. (formal IP, informal IP) 0.548 0.019 ***
Corr. (formal IP, innovation) 0.197 0.026 ***
Corr. (informal IP, innovation) 0.236 0.026 ***
Notes: 7144 observations on 5684 ﬁrms; log likelihood =−8967.1. The method of estimation is maximum likelihood on a trivariate
probit model. Standard errors are clustered around the enterprise. *, **, and *** denote signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level
respectively.
Table 3. Multivariate Probit estimates of IP choice and process innovation.
Formal IP methods Informal IP methods
Process innovator or
imitator
Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE
Log (predicted R&D per employee) 0.843 0.045 *** 0.636 0.044 *** 0.100 0.046 *
Log (number of employees) 0.321 0.016 *** 0.228 0.015 *** 0.085 0.016 ***
Log (ﬁrm age in 2011) 0.136 0.055 * 0.116 0.053 * 0.015 0.057
D (collaborates) −0.201 0.052 *** −0.038 0.054 0.573 0.052 ***
Firm perception of market risk 0.322 0.043 *** 0.365 0.044 *** 0.119 0.044 **
Firm perception of ﬁn. Constraints 0.121 0.043 ** 0.292 0.044 *** 0.016 0.043
Firm – impt. of reg. & standards 0.144 0.050 ** 0.122 0.052 * −0.183 0.053 ***
Firm – impt. of env., H&S regs. 0.046 0.051 0.157 0.054 ** 0.161 0.054 **
D (innov. to increase ﬂexibility) 0.480 0.055 ***
D (innov. to increase capacity) 0.408 0.053 ***
D (innov. to reduce unit cost) 0.180 0.054 ***
D (within-group impt. info source) −0.240 0.066 *** 0.089 0.064 0.471 0.072 ***
D (suppliers’ important info source) 0.287 0.047 *** 0.413 0.047 *** 0.319 0.051 ***
D (customers’ impt. info source) −0.136 0.055 * 0.129 0.053 * 0.032 0.059
D (competitors’ impt. info source) 0.169 0.045 *** 0.129 0.045 ** −0.109 0.047 *
D (universities’ impt. info source) 0.068 0.064 0.066 0.071 −0.113 0.064
D (imitator) −0.084 0.056 −0.054 0.064
Year dummies (2) 65.4 (0.000)*** 80.1 (0.000)*** 21.1 (0.000)***
Two-digit sector dummies (25) 298.2 (0.000)*** 105.4 (0.000)*** 45.2 (0.000)***
Wald test for model (d.f.) 5115.5 (125)***
Corr. (formal IP, informal IP) 0.547 0.019 ***
Corr. (formal IP, innovation) 0.039 0.024
Corr. (informal IP, innovation) 0.125 0.024 ***
Notes: 7144 observations on 5684 ﬁrms; log likelihood =−8959.6. The method of estimation is maximum likelihood on a trivariate
probit model. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity, and clustered on enterprise. *, **, and *** denote signiﬁcance at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.
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innovation does not depend on ﬁrm age. Information internal to the ﬁrm’s group is rated as impor-
tant for innovation, and information from suppliers is important only for process innovation. It
appears that meeting regulatory requirements or standards reduce the probability of innovation,
and that reducing environmental impacts and improving health and safety increases the probability
of process innovation. This may be because the results of innovative activities directed in this way are
somewhat more predictable.
The estimates of the production function are shown in Table 4, for four types of innovation:
product, process, and new-to-the-market product and process. The coefﬁcients of the usual pro-
duction function inputs (labour, capital, and materials) are as expected, and imply a scale coefﬁcient
slightly greater than unity. Few of the innovation or IP coefﬁcients are individually signiﬁcant, with the
exception of formal IP in the case of process innovation. However, when the coefﬁcients are com-
bined to identify the interaction of innovation probability with IP preferences, some highly signiﬁcant
results appear: for product innovation, formal IP coupled with high predicted innovation raises pro-
ductivity by about 12% (15% for new-to-the-market innovation), whereas informal IP coupled with
innovations has essentially no impact. For process innovation, there are similar results, although
the precision is lower, especially for new-to-the-market process innovation. The conclusion is that
innovating ﬁrms that rate formal IP as important for protecting their innovations achieve a substantial
gain in the contribution of their innovations to productivity growth.
5.2. Innovation spending
The estimates for the model using innovation spending as an input are presented in Table 1 (stage 1); to
save space, the stage 2 and 3 estimates are in online Appendix B (http://eml.berkeley.edu//~bhhall/papers/
HallSena_appendix_Mar15.pdf) (Tables B1–B3), as they differ little from those for R&D in Tables 2–4.
Table 4. OLS estimates of the production function.
Dependent variable Log (turnover)
Type of innovation Product innovation Process innovation
New-to-market
product innovation
New-to-market
process innovation
Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE
Log (number of employees) 0.664 0.011 *** 0.664 0.011 *** 0.663 0.011 *** 0.664 0.011 ***
Log (capital) 0.096 0.007 *** 0.097 0.007 *** 0.096 0.007 *** 0.096 0.007 ***
Log (materials) 0.276 0.010 *** 0.277 0.010 *** 0.276 0.010 *** 0.277 0.010 ***
Scale coefﬁcienta 1.036 0.006 *** 1.038 0.006 *** 1.035 0.006 *** 1.037 0.006 ***
Predicted prob. of innovation 0.000 0.050 −0.105 0.056 0.054 0.069 −0.256 0.180
D (formal IP important) * Pred P
of innov.
−0.007 0.038 −0.012 0.034 0.022 0.032 0.013 0.027
D (informal IP important) * Pred
P of innov.
0.028 0.034 0.035 0.032 0.025 0.029 0.030 0.025
D (formal IP important) 0.121 0.066 0.191 0.076 * 0.077 0.075 0.416 0.186 *
D (informal IP important) −0.006 0.070 0.019 0.080 −0.020 0.083 0.088 0.216
Prob. innov. and formal IP 0.114 0.055 ** 0.074 0.068 0.153 0.075 ** 0.173 0.216
Prob. innov. and informal IP 0.022 0.041 −0.051 0.051 0.059 0.054 −0.138 0.157
Prob. Innov. and both 0.136 0.031 *** 0.128 0.029 *** 0.158 0.038 *** 0.291 0.105 ***
F-test for 4 IP variables 3.6 (0.009)*** 6.6 (0.009)*** 2.6 (0.037)** 5.6 (0.009)***
F-test for 2 survey dummies 36.0 (0.000)*** 34.2 (0.000)*** 35.6 (0.000)*** 34.0 (0.000)***
F-test for 25 industry dummies 22.1 (0.000)*** 22.3 (0.000)*** 21.8 (0.000)*** 22.0 (0.000)***
F-test for model (df = 35) 1360.9 (0.000)*** 1357.5 (0.000)*** 1357.7 (0.000)*** 1357.2 (0.000)***
R-squared 0.902 0.902 0.902 0.902
SSR 2572.9 2571.7 2573.4 2572.4
Standard error 0.602 0.602 0.602 0.602
Notes: Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity, clustered on ﬁrm. Shaded coefﬁcients are derived from the estimated coefﬁ-
cients. 7144 observations on 5684 ﬁrms. *, **, and *** denote signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. Shaded
values are estimates computed from the estimated coefﬁcients.
aTest is for the scale coefﬁcient equal to unity.
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Table 5. Estimates of the production function by ﬁrm size.
Dependent variable Log (turnover)
Type of innovation Product Process
SMEs Large ﬁrms t-Testa SMEs Large ﬁrms t-Testa
Log (capital) 0.115 0.009 *** 0.069 0.011 *** 3.24 *** 0.116 0.009 *** 0.069 0.011 *** 3.31 ***
Log (number of employees) 0.705 0.018 *** 0.686 0.016 *** −0.79 0.707 0.018 *** 0.686 0.016 *** −0.87
Log (materials) 0.236 0.012 *** 0.361 0.016 *** 6.25 *** 0.237 0.012 *** 0.362 0.016 *** 6.25 ***
Prob. innovation 0.006 0.074 0.075 0.065 0.70 −0.157 0.081 0.030 0.072 1.73 *
Prob. innov. and formal IP 0.162 0.083 ** 0.111 0.070 −0.47 −0.027 0.109 0.131 0.083 1.15
Prob. innov. and informal IP −0.067 0.057 0.115 0.055 ** 2.30 ** −0.122 0.073 * 0.047 0.065 1.73 *
Prob. innov. and both 0.095 0.048 ** 0.151 0.040 *** 0.90 0.008 0.067 0.148 0.046 *** 1.72 *
F-test for 4 IP variables 2.8 (0.027)** 0.8 (0.554) 3.2 (0.011)** 1.6 (0.184)
SSR 1220.8 1224.5 1220.0 1225.3
Standard error 0.613 0.566 0.613 0.566
Observations (ﬁrms) 3285 (3022) 3859 (2831) 3285 (3022) 3859 (2831)
Notes: Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity, clustered on ﬁrm. F-test for difference of product models = 10.5. F-test for difference of process models = 10.4. SMEs are ﬁrms with employment less
than 250. *, **, and *** denote signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.
aThe t-test is for the equality of the coefﬁcient between manufacturing and services.
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Table 1 allows us to compare the estimates of a generalised Tobit model for innovation spending
to those for R&D investment alone. Note ﬁrst that there does not seem to be any correlation between
the unobserved propensity to spend on innovation and its level, conditional on all the ﬁrm charac-
teristics in the model, in contrast to the R&D model. Otherwise, the estimated coefﬁcients are similar
with a few exceptions. The most important is the difference in the sector’s formal IP importance,
which has little predictive power for innovation spending intensity and strong predictive power
for R&D. The other signiﬁcant differences are in the information sources: information from within
the group is a less important predictor of innovation spending, whereas information from suppliers
becomes positive and is a much more important predictor than it is for R&D intensity. Both results
undoubtedly reﬂect the importance of capital equipment and software spending as a component
of the larger innovation spending variable. Innovation that depends on the acquisition of new hard-
ware and software is less likely to be inﬂuenced by the importance of formal IP in the sector, and
more dependent on information from the suppliers of that equipment.
The ﬁnding in Appendix B that there are few large differences between instrumenting innovation
outcomes via R&D spending or innovation spending suggests that the choice will probably make little
difference to the predicted innovation probability and that is indeed the case, as is shown in Table B3.
There are essentially no differences in the estimates between Table 4 (which uses the R&D model)
and Table B3 (which uses the innovation spending model). The conclusion is that it makes no differ-
ence to the CDM model whether one uses R&D spending or innovation spending as the innovation
input, even though the two variables are in fact quite different for most ﬁrms. The correlation of the
two variables is about 0.35 and approximately half of the ﬁrms with innovation expenditures have no
R&D spending. However, it is important to keep in mind that these variables are being instrumented,
which means that what it really says is that the values of R&D and innovation spending predicted by
size, age, industry, exporting, ownership, collaborating, the IP and regulation environment, and
sources of information have the same impact on productivity. It is possible that our instruments
are not sufﬁciently powerful to see a differential effect, although this is a bit surprising, especially
in the case of process innovation, where we might have expected innovation spending to have
greater impact than R&D.
6. Size and sector
The previous results showed that ﬁrms favouring formal IP to protect their innovations have a pro-
ductivity higher by 10–20% for the same set of inputs, but that favouring only informal IP did not
have a similar impact. In this section, we examine how this result varies over ﬁrm size and broad
sector. To this end, we divide the sample into two groupings: (1) SMEs, deﬁned as ﬁrms with
fewer than 250 employees, and other (large) ﬁrms; (2) Manufacturing and Services, including con-
struction, trade, utilities, and business services. The full R&D model was re-estimated for both group-
ings and a summary of the results for the production function is shown in Table 5 (size) and Table 6
(sector).12 Both groupings produced estimates with a slightly better ﬁt than the pooled estimates.
Looking at Table 5, we ﬁrst note that the IP variables enter productivity jointly signiﬁcantly only for
the SMEs, but not for the larger ﬁrms. However, the earlier results on the importance of formal IP for
productivity in the case of product innovation still holds for SMEs; equally, both informal and formal
IP are important for the productivity of both SMEs and large ﬁrms in the case of product innovation.
The most interesting result is that when we split the sample like this, we can see that informal IP pro-
tection is much more important for large ﬁrm productivity than for SMEs, which is a somewhat sur-
prising result. It can be rationalised in the light of the theoretical model of Anton and Yao (2004) who
suggest that ﬁrms may be inclined to protect very valuable inventions (which may have a potential
large impact on their productivity) with secrecy rather than with patents to avoid the risks of potential
disclosure. That is, although the use of formal IP protection is more prevalent among large ﬁrms than
among small ﬁrms (Hall et al. 2013), these ﬁrms also seem to ﬁnd informal IP protection somewhat
more useful for increasing their productivity than smaller ﬁrms. This may reﬂect the fact that SMEs
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Table 6. Estimates of the production function by sector.
Dependent variable Log (turnover)
Type of innovation Product Process
Manufacturing Services & other t-Testa Manufacturing Services & other t-Testa
Log (capital) 0.027 0.010 *** 0.134 0.009 *** 7.95 *** 0.028 0.010 *** 0.134 0.010 *** 7.50 ***
Log (number of employees) 0.764 0.016 *** 0.587 0.014 *** 8.33 *** 0.765 0.016 *** 0.587 0.014 *** 8.37 ***
Log (materials) 0.334 0.017 *** 0.266 0.012 *** −3.27 *** 0.333 0.016 *** 0.266 0.012 *** −3.35 ***
Prob. innovation −0.164 0.058 ** 0.117 0.077 2.91 *** −0.297 0.066 *** 0.067 0.086 3.36 ***
Prob. innov. and formal IP −0.086 0.061 0.254 0.096 *** 2.99 *** −0.176 0.073 ** 0.299 0.121 ** 3.36 ***
Prob. innov. and informal IP −0.093 0.047 ** 0.076 0.069 2.02 *** −0.171 0.056 *** 0.042 0.087 2.06 ***
Prob. innov. and both −0.015 0.035 0.213 0.061 *** 3.24 *** −0.050 0.040 0.274 0.080 *** 3.62 ***
F-test for 4 IP variables 2.1 (0.083)* 1.9 (0.111) 3.9 (0.004)*** 2.8 (0.025)**
SSR 711.7 1748.2 708.7 1747.8
Standard error 0.482 0.658 0.481 0.658
Observations (ﬁrms) 3091 (2430) 4053 (3272) 3091 (2430) 4053 (3272)
Notes: Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity, clustered on ﬁrm. F-test for difference of product models = 9.2. F-test for difference of process models = 9.4. Services & other includes construction,
trade, and utilities in addition to services. *, **, and *** denote signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.
aThe t-test is for the equality of the coefﬁcient between manufacturing and services.
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have a greater need to access inputs external to the ﬁrm and therefore need to protect their knowl-
edge more formally.
Turning to the sector-speciﬁc estimates in Table 6, we ﬁnd ﬁrst that the importance of formal IP
over informal IP for productivity is supported strongly for the service sector, but much more ambigu-
ously for the manufacturing sector, where informal IP is as important as formal IP and both impacts
are negative. It turns out that this result is due primarily to the fact that a high probability of inno-
vation in that sector is associated with substantially lower measured productivity, regardless of the
ﬁrm’s preference for IP protection. Further exploration did not turn up an explanation for this
result. It may be due to the fact that there are longer lags between innovative activity and pro-
ductivity in this sector, or to problems in measuring the inputs to productivity in innovative ﬁrms.
7. Conclusions
In this paper, we have explored the estimation of an augmented CDM model that includes ﬁrm and
industry ratings of the importance of various forms of IP protection. We modelled the choice of the
appropriability mechanisms simultaneously with innovation success and then included the inter-
action of the choice with innovation in the productivity equation. We also explored the use of inno-
vation spending rather than R&D as an innovation predictor, and took a brief look at the differences
across ﬁrm size and sector.
There are a number of key results from this exploration. First, we found that ﬁrms who innovated
and rated formal IP highly were more productive than other ﬁrms, but that the same did not hold for
informal IP by itself, except possibly for large ﬁrms as opposed to SMEs. We also found that this result
was strongest for ﬁrms in the services, trade, and utility sectors, and negative in the manufacturing
sector, largely due to the negative impact of predicted innovation probability.
Second, we provide evidence that R&D spending is only a fraction of total innovation spending,
especially when we look beyond the manufacturing sector. However, the predictive power of the
two types of spending for productivity is very similar, at least when we instrument the variables.
Third, we noted that in spite of the previous result, there were signiﬁcant differences in the
equations that predict R&D and innovation spending. R&D intensity is higher in exporting ﬁrms,
those in formal IP sectors, and ﬁrms obtaining innovation information from within their group and
from universities, whereas innovation spending is higher when suppliers are an important infor-
mation source. This contrast appears to be one between the traditional technology-intensive
sectors (patenting, exporting, and closer to university science) and innovation in sectors that rely
on the acquisition of hardware and software to upgrade and change their processes.
Our study suffers from a number of limitations. Most importantly, we found that predicted process
and product innovation probabilities were so highly correlated that it is not really possible to tease
out their separate impact in the same productivity equation, and we chose to analyse them separ-
ately to look for differences. We found relatively few differences, with the exception of a clear associ-
ation of process innovation and information from suppliers. Second, the use of an IP importance
rating as a proxy for IP use is somewhat untested, although we know they are related from our
earlier work (Hall et al. 2013). A related problem is that the relationship between IP preferences
and innovation is also rather imprecise, as the preference is based on the general outlook of the
ﬁrm and the innovation(s) something that may have happened any time during the previous
three years. That is, we do not have a precise measure of an innovation and the choice of IP for
that innovation, only broad ﬁrm-level indicators.
Another limitation of this analysis, which we share with most studies using innovation data, is that
it is conducted at the enterprise level, so that we cannot be sure that the answers to the questions on
methods of IP protection are directly related to the innovation(s) identiﬁed by the ﬁrm as introduced
during the preceding three years. Thus, our data and our results are likely to contain considerable
noise. In general, this will weaken rather than strengthen the results, especially for the larger ﬁrms
that have many activities.
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Nor do we have an indicator of the quality of the innovation. This means that our ﬁnding of higher
productivity when innovating ﬁrms favour formal IP protection may reﬂect the fact that ﬁrms with
high-quality innovations leading to higher productivity are also those more likely to use formal IP.
The precise interpretation of our result matters, because if the formal IP–productivity relationship
is due to higher quality, there is no implication that ﬁrms should shift to using formal IP, whereas
if protecting any type of innovation with formal IP increases productivity, there would be such an
implication. We leave the resolution of this conundrum to future work.
Notes
1. In this survey, over 50% of ﬁrms ranked lead time as the most important mechanism to appropriate returns to
their innovation and nearly 17% regarded secrecy as the most important way to protect an innovation. In con-
trast, only about 10% regarded patents as the most effective way to secure returns.
2. Arundel (2001) also states that this result may be counterintuitive as theoretically small ﬁrms may ﬁnd patents
more valuable than large ﬁrms as they would help them to enter an industry. Although this is clearly true for
a small subset of small ﬁrms (those relying on external ﬁnancing such as venture capital), it may not be true
for small ﬁrms in general.
3. However, Leiponen and Byma (2009) ﬁnd that small ﬁrms cooperating in innovation with competitors prefer lead
time to patents to protect their IP.
4. Clearly this is an evolving area. To the extent that software and business method patenting are available, some
parts of the service sector may indeed beneﬁt from formal IP. In addition, copyright and trademark protection
may be very useful in some services.
5. This is by no means an uncommon ﬁnding when using Innovation Survey data (Hall, Lotti, and Mairesse 2012).
6. Due to the lack of independent instruments, we do not use predicted values of the IP variables but instead rely on
the dummies themselves. As in the case of product and process innovation, exploration using interactions of the
two sets of predicted values for these various dummy variables yielded highly insigniﬁcant and implausible
results.
7. In fact, the CIS 5 survey was based on the same stratiﬁed sample as the CIS 4 survey, so there is slightly more
overlap than implied by drawing a new sample each year.
8. The industries deleted were the two-digit sectors (SIC 2007) 1–9 and 80–99.
9. Note that because we also include two-digit industry dummies in the regressions, the demand-pull effects are
measured relative to the average for the relevant industry.
10. Also, Canepa and Stoneman (2008) report that ﬁrms from high-tech industries are more likely to report a project
being abandoned or delayed thanks to ﬁnancial constraints.
11. See, for instance, Tiwari et al. (2007) for a study of how ﬁnancial constraints interact with market uncertainties
(among the others) and inﬂuence R&D spending.
12. We also estimated the full innovation spending model, but as we saw earlier, it makes little difference for the pro-
ductivity equation which model we use, so we do not show these estimates.
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